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21. Introduction 
Ariel Rubinstein’s (2006) sceptic comment on the study of economics hits a nerve of many 
economists who worry that what they teach and the way in which they teach may indoctrinate 
students. Rubinstein conducted a questionnaire in which students had to decide whether to 
meet a company’s goal of making high profits by laying off workers or to fire less, which, as 
a consequence, results in lower profits. In his survey economists turned out to put on average 
a much higher weight on the company’s profit than non-economists. Rubinstein’s conjecture 
is that economics students’ “views on economic issues are influenced by the way we teach, 
perhaps without them even realizing it.” This is a serious accusation and our immediate 
response to his article was astonishment. Is our way off teaching really flawed? There are 
some big clouds of doubts that made us reluctant to follow Rubinstein’s recommendation to 
consider changing our teaching methods.  
Firstly, the fact that economists put more emphasis on profit maximization in a survey may be 
attributed to a self-selection bias (i.e., economic studies attract certain types of students) 
rather than indoctrination through teaching. As Rubinstein admitted, his questionnaire did not 
allow for any conclusive evidence. It is thus important to separate these effects before 
questioning the way we teach economics. 
Secondly, it is a general phenomenon that the way a problem is framed can substantially 
affect decisions. The frame used in Rubinstein’s survey puts students into the role of a 
manager. The problem is that the potential effect of this framing is not controlled for in 
Rubinstein’s paper. Do subjects only consider the workers’ welfare and the profit of the 
company as Rubinstein suggests? Or do they also think about what might happen to a 
manager who does not act in the interest of the company’s owners? In order to clarify this 
point, we added a second frame, which allows testing whether the particular role influences 
subjects’ choices.
To deal with these questions we conducted a similar but modified survey with students from 
the University of Cologne and the University of Magdeburg in Germany. In the next section 
3we briefly describe the survey design and then discuss the main results in section 3. Section 4 
concludes.
2. Modifying Rubinstein’s questionnaire 
We tried to design our online survey in a way that on the one hand allows us to compare our 
data with those generated by Rubinstein (2006), but on the other hand also allows us to gain 
some more insights.1 In the first two questions we followed the experimental design by 
Rubinstein as closely as possible. In total we asked 469 students2 to consider the following 
situation 
“Assume that you are vice president of ILJK company. The company provides 
extermination services and employs administrative workers who cannot be fired and 196 
non-permanent workers who do the actual extermination work and can be fired. The 
company was founded 5 years ago and is owned by three families. The work requires 
only a low level of skills so that each worker requires only one week of training. All of 
the company’s employees have been with the company for three to five years. The 
company pays its workers more than minimum wage. A worker’s wage, which includes 
overtime, amounts to 20,000 Euro per year and exceeds welfare benefit payments. The 
company provides its employees with all the benefits required by law.  
Until recently, the company was very profitable. As a result of the recent recession, 
however, there has been a significant drop in profits though the company is still in the 
black. You will attend a board meeting at which a decision will be made as to how many 
workers to layoff.” 
Analogously to Rubinstein, the first question was presented in two different ways. A total of 
299 economics and non-economics students received the following information (Treatment 
Q-Table):
1 Subjects earned €10 with a probability of 1/3 (every third answer was awarded). 
2 Note that we excluded 72 students from our analysis because their answers were mistaken. In most of these 
cases subjects mixed up the number of employed and laid off workers. Including these observations does not 
change our results, however  
4“ILJK’s Finance Department has prepared the following forecast of annual profits: 
Number of workers who will 
continue to be employed 
Expected annual profit 
in Euro millions 
0 (all the workers will be laid off) Loss of 8 
50 (146 workers will be laid off) Profit of 1 
65 (131 workers will be laid off) Profit of 1.5 
100 (96 workers will be laid off) Profit of 2 
144 (52 workers will be laid off) Profit of 1.6 
170 (26 workers will be laid off) Profit of 1 
196 (no layoffs) Profit of 0.4 
Another 98 students who were either advanced undergraduate economists or advanced 
undergraduate engineers were informed that (Treatment Q-Formula): 
“ILJK’s Finance Department has prepared a forecast of annual profits according to which 
the employment of x workers will result in annual profits of (in Euro millions): 
80,12  xx .”
Both groups of students had to state the number of workers they would recommend to 
continue to employ (Q1). After that, we asked them to predict the recommendation of a real 
vice president (Q2). Q1 and Q2 are identical to the questions used by Rubinstein.
In contrast to Rubinstein, we asked a third question in order to test how answers are affected 
by the framing of the questions. Do students only consider the workers’ welfare and the profit 
of the company? Or do they also think about their own standing as the company’s vice 
president? Since it is not clear what students have in mind when answering Q1, Q3 puts them 
into a situation in which they need not care about their own future as vice president:
Assume that you are near retirement and you just have to make this decision. What would 
be your recommendation? 
3. Findings 
The most interesting message of Rubinstein’s paper is that economists care more about profit 
maximization than non economists and that they do not think much about the fate of the 
workers who loose their jobs. Figure 1 compares the numbers of workers who are still 
employed after the decisions of economists and non economists in treatment Q-Table: 
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Figure 1: Average number of workers who will continue to be employed 
For Q1, our study reproduces the results of Rubinstein’s experiment. Economists decided to 
employ significantly less workers than non economists when being confronted with a table.3
Table 1 compares the observations obtained in both surveys. 
Hebrew/Tel Aviv Cologne/Magdeburg 
Economists 
Non-
economists
Total Economists 
Non-
economists 
Total
n = 224 368 592 156 183 339 
100 (profit maximum) 47% 22% 31% 38% 15% 27% 
144/10 40% 53% 48% 44% 52% 47% 
196 (no layoffs) 10% 18% 15% 14% 29% 21% 
others 3% 7% 6% 4% 4% 4% 
Average layoffs 66 46 53 61 40 51 
Table 1: Data obtained in Treatment Q-Table. 
Concerning the other two questions the differences between economists and non economists 
are much smaller and in case of Q2 insignificant. That is, both groups assess the behaviour of 
real managers in a similar way. When close to retirement (Q3), economists still decide to lay 
off more workers than non economists, though the average difference drops from 22 in Q1 to 
11 in Q3. 
                                                
3 Two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests are used for between-group comparisons, Wilcoxon tests are used for 
within-group comparisons. Differences are labelled as significant if p < 0.050 and are labelled as weakly 
significant if 0.050p < 0.100. 
6This last observation leads to the question whether the frame of the questions is important. 
Remember that Q1 was presented in two different ways. 98 of our subjects were confronted 
with a profit formula while the other 299 saw a table displaying the number of employed 
workers and the corresponding profit. While we find no significant differences between the 
decisions of economists and non economists working with the formula, there is a strong and 
significant difference between the two frames. In the “table frame” on average 140.5 workers 
continued to work and in the “formula frame” only 109.6 were not laid off. The latter result 
reproduces the findings obtained by Rubinstein. 
Figure 2 illustrates that with regard to Q3 (the specific situation of the manager), too, the 
frame turns out to be of importance. Particularly economists employ significantly more 
workers when they are forced to imagine that they are near retirement, i.e. are in a position in 
which their decision has much less personal consequences. Moreover, in Q3, the average 
decision of those equipped with the table is no longer significantly different from the average 
decision of students equipped with the formula. 
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Figure 2: Framing effect: Q1 vs. Q3. 
Rubinstein points out that economics students show a much stronger tendency to maximise 
profits than subjects in other groups, but he could no determine clearly whether differences 
are due to a self-selection bias or are the result of indoctrination. Since he found (significant?) 
differences between economics students and MBA students trained in doing case studies, he 
7tentatively concluded that the difference might indeed be the result of the way in which 
economics is taught at universities: “the study of cases might stimulate more comprehensive 
thinking about real life problems whereas the study of economics through mathematical 
exercises conceals the need to balance between conflicting interests” (Rubinstein 2006, C8). 
To distinguish the self-selection bias from “indoctrination”, we compared decisions made by 
first-term economics students and advanced undergraduate economics students. Our results 
reveal that education does not significantly matter for economics students. Instead of 
becoming more interested in profit maximization they even seem to learn to give the worker’s 
welfare more weight – although the increase of employment is not significant (p = 0.174). 
Note that also the education of non economics students does not change their behaviour. 
Figure 3 reports the results: 
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Figure 3: Number of workers to be employed in Q1.
4. Discussion 
The comparison of our results and those obtained by Rubinstein shows that the empirical 
evidence is not as clear as Rubinstein’s paper suggests. First of all, we demonstrate that the 
frames of the original Rubinstein questions are of great importance. The first question in the 
questionnaires of both surveys unfortunately leaves much room for interpretations. What 
happens to the workers who were laid off? What consequences do employment decisions 
8have for the vice president himself? Subjects answering Q1 may or may not have particular 
answers to these and other questions in mind when they decide. The problem is, that we can 
not control for the individual interpretation given by each subject. The answers to our new 
question Q3 demonstrate that a different interpretation of the vice presidents situation makes a 
significant difference. Thus, we can not rule out the possibility that other parts of the frame 
also influence decisions and that economists and non economists differ systematically in their 
interpretations of the economic situation they are confronted with. For example, it seems 
plausible that students, who plan to become managers and who are educated in management 
and economics are more likely to have the fantasy that they are really involved in the situation 
as a responsible manager than students of other disciplines. The Rubinstein interpretation that 
economists systematically put a higher weight on profit maximization because they are 
trained to solve economic problems with the help of formal models is not coactive – other 
interpretations are even likely. 
Another, more general question is how to interpret the observation that students of economics 
seem to care more about profit-maximization. The efficient use of resources is a core topic in 
economics and we emphasize this point over and over again. We also stress that markets can 
do (under certain circumstances) a good job in achieving efficiency and we should therefore 
not wonder that students of economics might perceive the social cost of firing workers lower 
than others do. It should be no surprise when both groups, on average, do not find the same 
answer. In no case, we can infer from that outcome an indoctrination bias. An elaborate 
discussion of this question is far beyond the scope of this comment, however, and leaves 
much room for future work.  
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